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By Barbara A. Noah

A Role for Law in Preparing for Death
Advance care planning may help prevent conflicts

"Timor mortis conturbat me."' (The fear of death

issues concerning the risks and benefits of continued
treatment. The advent of modern technologies enables
physicians to keep patients alive when their bodies
would otherwise succumb to their underlying disease
or injury. When life-sustaining technologies are used to
assist a patient through a difficult illness or injury and
return to health, there's rarely any question about their
appropriateness. When, however, a patient's illness has
progressed to the point where there's no hope of cure
or even improvement, the use of these technologies in
a way that merely prolongs dying poses vexing questions of ethical futility and proper use oflimited medical
resources. It's in such situations that conflicts arise, as the
protracted legal dispute and public debate over the life
and death of Theresa Schiavo so painfully illustrated.'
But the medicalization of dying has created more
than just conundrums about the appropriate use of
medical technology The emphasis on technology as
the primary mechanism of medical care has gradually supplanted, or at least marginalized, other fundamental aspects of caregiving, such as communication
and spending time with grieving patients and their
families. Physicians lament the lost art of caregiving as
technology talces over and leaves little time for addressing each patient's emotional needs. Many patients, experiencing fear and confusion about the nature of their
condition and its treatment or simply sensing that their
physicians are pressed for time, hesitate to ask questions
or express their sense of despair or fear.

distresses me.)
nd-of-life law, though flawed, offers an opportunity to express individual values and preferences, via advance directives, health care proxies
and other documents, to prepare for death before it's
imminent. Yet, many people avoid the thinking process
that's necessary to make these preparations, because the
thought of death is uncomfortable to confront. Most
decide, consciously or unconsciously; not to decide. If
this decision is the result of a voluntary and considered
choice to accept mortality by relinquishing attempts to
exert control over death and the dying process, then
perhaps all is well, at least for the dying individual. If,
however, the non-decision arises out of a reluctance to
confront death, then the non-deciders do themselves
a disservice, not ouly at the time of death, but also
throughout the life that precedes it.
Modern medical technology exacerbates this problem. In this era of highly technological care, physicians
and patients often feel complementarily reluctant to
engage in discussions about the patient's values, preferences and concerns or, worse, even to acknowledge the
fact of the patient's dying.

E

Medicalization of Dying
The law is, of course, an imperfect tool to prevent endof-life disputes and avoid over-use of life-prolonging
technology. Physicians also bear their share of responsibility in promoting communication about complex

Advance Care Planning
Modern medical technology has created a lacuna of
end-of-life dilemmas, which has triggered a need for
legal intervention in the decision-making process.
Optimally, there would be no need for law, except to
acknowledge and defend the presumption of individual
choice. In fact, the law of decisionmaking at the end
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of life is, in a broad sense, well settled. Nevertheless,
because patients often don't or can't choose, conflicts

about the use of technologies at the end oflife arise, and
these conflicts take a substantial toll on families, health
care providers and society. To avoid these clashes, individuals can "practice death;" that is, acknowledge the
certainty of death, make and articulate choices about
end-of-life preferences, discuss these preferences with

their family members, physicians and attorneys and
revisit these choices on a regular basis via some form of
advance care planning document or health care proxy.
The mere act of routinely considering and discussing

end -of-life choices will do more to prevent conflicts and

Sonle corT:nlentutors have
suggested obcmdonmg efforts to
encourage the use of adv<Jnce

and normalizes discussion of mortality by asldng clients

to think about what values are most important to them.
No amount of legislation can serve to cajole or compel
individuals to confront these issues, but attorneys have

some opportunity to help their clients to do so.

End-of-Life Law
In the United States, we have a multi-layered legal system designed to protect our health care decision-making
rights through a combination offederal and state statutes and judicial decisions. It's well settled that end-oflife law in the United States protects an individual's
right of decisionmaking about health care {including
the right to ignore the topic), though it does little to
promote the decisionmaking itself. These legal rights
are grounded in the ethical principle of autonomy and
include the right to refuse treatment, whether or not
one is terminally ill, the right to continue receiving life-

prolonging treatment even when terminally ill (though
this value becomes subject to dispute if the treatment
appears futile) and, in some states, the right to hasten
death with the assistance of a physician.

cllrect1ves altoqel:her

over-use of life-sustaining technology than any statute.

3

Still, the irony persists that clients often make elaborate plans about how their worldly goods will be
distributed after their death, while remaining reluctant to articulate preferences about their own jour-

ney. As death isn't optional, estate-planning attorneys
have both an opportunity and an obligation to advise
clients of the importance of advance care planning,
along with plans for the disposition of their estates.
By doing so, attorneys can achieve several goals:
1) informing clients of their right to make decisions
about life-prolonging care, including the right to refuse
care; 2) malting clients aware of the various mechanisms to document their choices in advance, includ-

Advance Directives
Advance directives promote autonomy because they formalize an individual's wishes about treatment choices,

and they can serve as a guide to the treating physician
and the family about how to proceed if the individual
is unable to speak for himself. These documents can
give patients a sense of control over their health care

should they lose decisional capacity In many respects,
however, this sense of control is an illusion. Advance
directives may have limited application under state
law, and more seriously, they may not be accurate predictors of what a now-capacitated individual
would really choose under the exact circumstances

ing living wills, the appointment of health care proxies
and Physician Orders for Life Sustaining Treatment
{POLST) forms that allow patients to request that phy-

when later incapacitated by illness. They're frequently

sicians withhold life-sl!.staining treatments and less
aggressive interventions and record their preferences

at hand and overruled by family members or ignored
by health care providers. Family pressures and societal
expectations about what individuals should choose

regarding resuscitation, artificial nutrition and hydralion and hospital transfer;' 3) discussing with clients the
risks of not documenting their preferences or, at least,
---

appointing a trusted person to speak on their behalf
should they be unable to speak for themselves; and
4) creating a relationship with clients that demystifies

~~-~-~
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inaccessible at key decision-making points, insufficiently specific to address the actual medical decision

may also influence those who make advance directives.
With these problems in mind, some commentators have
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suggested abandoning efforts to encourage the use of
advance directives altogether.5

supportive measures, it's difficult to know when to
cease providing support to a person whose condition
won't improve. In such circumstances, the U.S. health
care system and its providers are often reluctant to
opine about an incapacitated patient's best interests

There is, however, a compelling argument in favor

of continuing and expanding the practice; namely, the
inherent and immediate benefit to the individual of
thinking about and executing an advance directive
or discussing preferences with a health care proxy.

and, generally, will revert to erring on the side of
continued treatment.

tural context in which individuals can consider and

With the evolution of life-supportive technologies
and interventions, we add to our arsenal for delaying

articulate to themselves and others their values and

death-we almost always can do something more. We've

preferences about how they wish to live, as well as
how they wish to die. Diligently considering death
prospectively and discussing it in detail with family members or an attorney may seem unappealing
to many people. Surveys suggest that no more than
20 percent of adults have completed advance directives.6 Even so, advance care planning, with all of its
flaws in content and implementation, helps provide
guidance to family members and health care provid-

all heard grieving families assure others that "the doctors did everything they could:' "Doing everything" may
help assuage feelings of helplessness on the part of fami-

Laws encouraging advance directives provide a struc-

Our cultut·e dtscourc1CIEccS
sell-examinalion as pcllt ol the

ers and provides important ancillary benefits for the

process of preparing Fm death.

individual who takes on the task.
Ideally, when a patient can no longer articulate his
wishes, the decision should center on whether continued
treatment would be the patient's authentic choice; that is,
the choice that reflects careful thought, self-knowledge
and reflection and that acknowledges the external influences that shape an individual's identity. Autonomy

lies and caregivers, but it's not necessarily in the patient's
best interests, nor does it always reflect the patient's

authentic choice. One important aspect of the futility
question concerns quality of life. Even if a treatment or

technology extends life, should physicians provide it if
the patient will experience no added benefit in the form
of improved function?
Choosing to "err on the side of life" to avoid difficult conversations about quality oflife has created a
further ethical dilemma when coupled with broadly

means more than possessing a choice-it means exer-

cising that choice in a way that holistically reflects the
patient's values, preferences and beliefs within the context of her current, and evolving, life circumstances. It

requires the confrontatimi of death, its inevitability and
the possibility that, in some cases, death will become
preferable to continued life. 7

available medical technologies designed to sustain
life. As a society, we're equally reluctant to consider

Ethical Dilemmas

explicitly or to discuss the cost of end-of-life care as

Complicating matters further, the ethical principle of

we evaluate whether and when to cease life-support9
ive measures and therapeutic interventions. Similarly,
patients frequently misunderstand or fail to receive
information about the potential success of various treatments and interventions. Statistical fallacies and unrea-

autonomy coexists in an uneasy detente with the prin-

ciple of beneficence, which requires that physicians
provide medical care that's in their patients' best interests. When a patient's wishes are unclear, determining
"best interests" is often difficult. The co-existence of
principles of autonomy and beneficence creates dis-

sonable optimism lead patients to request and physicians to provide treatments that offer little or no real

agreements about futility: whether and when further

benefit and to discount the potential harm of such care.'"

treatment or life-sustaining measures are no longer

Physicians also tend to overestimate the remaining life
spans of seriously ill patients and to convey overly optimistic prognoses.u Even worse, a surprising number of

medically or ethically appropriate." Without guidance
about a patient's preferences regarding continued life-

- - - -
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physicians acknowledge deliberate deception of patients
in discussing their prognoses. In a recent survey of physicians, one in I 0 admitted to lying to a patient within
the previous year, while over half acknowledged that
they had been unreasonably opthnistic about a patient's
prognosis. 12

websites and blogs on the experience and process of ter-

minal illness. Death memoirs are nothing new, but they
appear to have multiplied in recent decades. Some of
these memoirs contemplate what it means to be a patient

captive to medicine and disease or describe a brave
battle and its consequent appreciation of life. Others
explain the experience of terminal illness as casting the
sufferer into the role of an outsider, no longer a member

Cultural Factors
The willingness to engage in the kind of self-examina-

of society. This modern tendency to share the intimate
thoughts and experiences of illness via blogs and specialized social networks seems diametrically opposed

tion that's consistent with making advance directives

depends on both cultural factors and individual characteristics. For multiple reasons, we collectively have little
appetite to address end-of-life issues before they arise in
crisis form. The luxury of time, in the form oflonger life
spans, together with the promise of advanced therapies,
has created the illusion that there's thne to delay confronting mortality. Unlike the rest of the animal king-

to our general unwillingness to engage in advance care

plauning or to acknowledge and accept aging and the
prospect of death.
So what, if anything, does all of this have to do with
law? The short answer is: despite the multiplicity of state
and federal statutes and judicial decisions on end-of-life
decision making, not much. The problem we confront
runs much deeper than what any law can solve. Our cul-

dom, we are, however, conscious of our mortality. Our

superiority in this regard brings with it fear of death.
Philosopher Ernst Becker has captured the paradox
quite elegantly:

ture discourages self-examination as a part of the process
of preparing for death. We unconsciously, or sometimes
deliberately, decide not to make choices that are ours to

Man is literally split in two: he has an awareness of
his own splendid uniqueness in that he sticks out
of nature with a towering majesty, and yet he goes
back into the ground a few feet in order blindly
and dumbly to rot and disappear forever."

malce. Yet, our legal rights regarding end-of-life decisionmaking only have their fullest impact in preventing
unwanted suffering at the end of life if we address death

As Becker observes, this "existential dualism makes an
impossible situation, an excruciating dilemma:>l4
Cultural portrayals of older people exacerbate our
ambivalence about aging. As the average life span
lengthens, we hear phrases like "50 is the new 30" and

Although advance directives are only occasionally

and dying before a serious illness forces the issue.

Considering the Future
consulted in making treatment decisions for patients

who've lost decisional capacity, the process of thinking
about the issues to which a good- advance directive
demands attention is inherently valuable, not only as an
opportunity to exercise some choice over how we die,

see advertisements for «adult communities" (no longer

"retirement communities" or "elder housing") depicting
smiling, vigorous people playing tennis or golf We also
increasingly deny the reality of aging and dying. As one
commentator wryly observed, " [o] nee regarded as an
unyielding, utterly unforgiving, brute feature of existence, death is increasingly portrayed as a bad lifestyle
option:>Js
Unsurprisingly, some medical researchers already
talk of doubling the human life span, even of a "cure for
death;' and of aging as a disease that should be treated.
Paradoxically, alongside these anti-aging, age-defying
cultural sentiments, we've made an industry of death
and dying. In the United States and elsewhere, there
are multitudes of death memoirs and manuals, sharing
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but also as a means of enhancing all remaining life. The
process of thinking about an advance directive, revis-

ing it and discussing it with an attorney, physician and
family presents an opportunity for each individual to
reorient himself individually to goals and ways of living
that provide meaning on a personal level. Ultimate],y.
advance directives are about living, not dying.
~j
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Juxtaposition
"Soviet/American Array VII" (78'/• in. by
51 in.) by Robert Rauschenberg, sold for
$23,750 at Christie's recent Prints and
Multiples Sale in New York on July 15, 2014.
The Texas-born Rauschenberg was a painter
and graphic artist whose early works
anticipated the Pop Art Movement.

trustsandestates.com

59

